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**PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY**

**9774/03**

Paper 3 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy and Theology 2

**May/June 2018**

MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 50

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**Published**

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

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This document consists of **9** printed pages.

**Generic Marking Principles**

These general marking principles must be applied by all examiners when marking candidate answers. They should be applied alongside the specific content of the mark scheme or generic level descriptors for a question. Each question paper and mark scheme will also comply with these marking principles.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 1:**

Marks must be awarded in line with:

- the specific content of the mark scheme or the generic level descriptors for the question
- the specific skills defined in the mark scheme or in the generic level descriptors for the question
- the standard of response required by a candidate as exemplified by the standardisation scripts.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 2:**

Marks awarded are always **whole marks** (not half marks, or other fractions).

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 3:**

Marks must be awarded **positively**:

- marks are awarded for correct/valid answers, as defined in the mark scheme. However, credit is given for valid answers which go beyond the scope of the syllabus and mark scheme, referring to your Team Leader as appropriate
- marks are awarded when candidates clearly demonstrate what they know and can do
- marks are not deducted for errors
- marks are not deducted for omissions
- answers should only be judged on the quality of spelling, punctuation and grammar when these features are specifically assessed by the question as indicated by the mark scheme. The meaning, however, should be unambiguous.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 4:**

Rules must be applied consistently e.g. in situations where candidates have not followed instructions or in the application of generic level descriptors.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 5:**

Marks should be awarded using the full range of marks defined in the mark scheme for the question (however; the use of the full mark range may be limited according to the quality of the candidate responses seen).

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 6:**

Marks awarded are based solely on the requirements as defined in the mark scheme. Marks should not be awarded with grade thresholds or grade descriptors in mind.

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Topic 1 Philosophy of Mind</b>		
<b>Section A</b> [Extract from <b>Derek Parfit</b> : <i>Reasons and Persons</i> : 281]		
1(a)	<p><b>Parfit rejects the Non-Reductionist View of persons.</b></p> <p><b>With reference to this passage, explain Parfit’s ideas about persons.</b></p> <p>Reductionist philosophy aims to reduce complex entities to simpler ones. In the philosophy of mind, this amounts to reducing mental properties to the properties described by natural science. Thus Parfit rejects any ideas about persons that involve the concept of enduring identity, and accepts those which refer instead to continuity and connectedness. The reductionist approach holds that the physical criterion of ‘identity’ involves the physically continuous existence (terminated at death) of enough of a brain to remain the brain of a living person. Reductionist views hold that a person’s identity over time consists in the holding of certain particular facts, and that these facts can be described without presupposing the identity of this person, or claiming that the experiences in this person’s life are held by this person, or even claiming explicitly that this person exists. Dualist ideas are to be rejected in favour of accepting that each person’s existence involves simply the existence of a brain and a body, the doing of certain deeds, and the thinking of certain thoughts, and so on. The existence of overlapping memory chains provides the basis for talking about psychological continuity or connectedness.</p>	<b>10</b>
1(b)	<p><b>Evaluate Parfit’s ideas about the nature of personal identity.</b></p> <p>The substance of Parfit’s argument is powerful, since there are a number of facts about persons that accord with the importance Parfit gives to mental continuity and connectedness. For example, candidates might refer to one or more of the implications of the thought-experiments which Parfit discusses, where the concept of identity remains elusive, but where it is a simpler matter to show the existence of psychological continuity. We tend to believe, perforce, that our existence is a deep, significant fact about the world, but Parfit sees this as a psychological deceit. Where a person exists at time 1 and a person exists at time 2, these persons might share memories and personality traits, but there are no further facts in the world that require these to be the same person. From these views, Parfit derives a revised context of morality and social control. In opposition to Parfit, candidates might discuss a number of issues: for example, some might attempt a defence of Substance Dualism or a critique of any theory of mind that is reductionist. Parfit claims that where strong connectedness exists between different states of a person, then psychological continuity is maintained, but this seems to be making use of the criterion that Parfit is supposed to be analysing, for example the concept of ‘same person’. Many people, including some philosophers, are reluctant to abandon concepts of identity in the same way that they are instinctively reluctant to abandon the concept of freedom of the will.</p>	<b>15</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Section B</b>		
2	<p><b>Critically examine property dualism as a theory of mind.</b></p> <p>Candidates are likely to introduce some form of property dualism (PD) as a theory of mind that is non-reductive. PD does not insist that mental properties are nothing over and above physical properties, but posits that mental properties differ from physical properties. The advantage of PD over substance dualism is the former's monist approach: the duality of Cartesian substances is abandoned in favour of the existence, solely, of physical substance exhibiting two different properties – the physical and the mental. Thus, for example, Davidson argues that mental properties supervene on physical properties. Supervenient phenomena are not subject to analytic or ontological reduction. Moreover, changes in the supervenient phenomena are possible only through a corresponding co-variant change in the subvenient base, so ultimately mental events exist because of the primacy of the physical. The theory is obviously attractive: it requires only one kind of substance, and maintains a physical explanation for mental events; nevertheless, PD suffers from some major problems, foremost being the fact that supervenient mental events involve the complex issue of consciousness, and PD finds this very hard to explain. Further, PD has the problem of explaining how physical brain events can cause non-physical mental events. Candidates might also discuss the problem of mental impotence: if brain events cause mental events, then mental events would appear (contrary to what seems to be the case) causally impotent.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>OR</b>		
3	<p><b>Critically assess the view that mental states are identical with brain states.</b></p> <p>The question asks candidates to assess Mind-Brain Identity Theory (MBIT): for every mental state there is a brain-state with which it is identical. For example, every pain event is held to be identical with C-fibres firing. In support of MBIT, mental events do appear to be localised in specific areas of the brain. People who suffer localised brain damage also suffer localised damage to the mind, and the most natural explanation of localisation is that the mind <i>is</i> the brain.</p> <p>The theory is propounded variously in a type-type and a token-token format. Support from the former comes from successful scientific reductions, for example, that lightning consists of electrical discharges and water consists of H<sub>2</sub>O, on the basis of which MBIT philosophers suggested that a given type of mental state will be found to be identical with a given type of brain state. So, just as water is always identical with H<sub>2</sub>O, pains will always be found to be identical with C-fibres firing.</p> <p>Type-identity theory is problematic in that it restricts mental states to humans, whereas it seems likely that different biological systems could develop mentality. Mental states do appear to be multiply realisable, so that, for example, in people with severe localised brain damage, other parts of the brain can and do take over the functions of the damaged sections, and for this reason, many espouse a token-token version of MBIT in which a token of one type can be identical with tokens of different types, for example, in the way that ‘wristwatch’, ‘Big Ben’ and ‘digital clock’ are different tokens of the type ‘timepiece’ that nevertheless have identity in having some construction that tells the time.</p> <p>Candidates might argue that MBIT is a plausible alternative to dualism, since the correlation between mental states and brain states is obvious to a point, for example, in that damage to the brain causes damage to the mind. Some might argue that MBIT, for example, falls foul of Leibniz’s law of the Identity of Indiscernibles; that it cannot account for the intentionality of mental states; that individuals do seem to have privileged access to their own mental states; and that materialism is unsatisfactory in general. Equally, candidates might aim to refute such challenges.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Topic 2 Ethics</b>		
<b>Section A</b> [Extract from <b>John Stuart Mill: <i>Utilitarianism</i> 258]</b>		
4(a)	<p><b>Examine how in this passage John Stuart Mill defends Utilitarianism against the accusation that it ‘is a doctrine worthy only of swine.’</b></p> <p>Candidates should explain why the accusation of ‘swine philosophy’ emerged, with focus on Bentham’s hedonic calculus measuring the predicted consequences of actions in terms of amount of pleasure. One reading of ‘amount’ of pleasure was ‘quantity’, with Bentham himself accused of this interpretation. In this passage, Mill argues that it is consistent with Utilitarianism to consider quality of pleasure as well as quantity. He argues that this is the higher ground for the utilitarian to take, since all educated people prefer the pleasures of the mind, and thus attempts to rescue it from the accusation.</p>	<b>10</b>
4(b)	<p><b>Examine the Utilitarian claim that morality should only be about the pursuit of pleasure and the prevention of pain.</b></p> <p>Candidates will offer a wide range of responses. Many will use the passage above and examine the helpfulness of Mill’s definition of pleasure as a morally relevant feature of decision making. Some may engage with the wider question of what is meant by pleasure and include Bentham’s thinking. The full range of marks is available for those who also include reflection on ‘the prevention of pain’, although it is not necessary for the two elements to be dealt with in equal measure. This question may be approached through practical examples or by engagement with other ethical systems. Some may consider what morality should be about if it is not ‘only about the pursuit of pleasure and the prevention of pain’.</p>	<b>15</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Section B</b>		
5	<p><b>Critically assess the challenge made to traditional Christian ethics by Fletcher’s situation ethics.</b></p> <p>Some background context is desirable – existentialism, relativism, cultural milieu, etc. Some understanding of the tradition of Christian ethics will need to be identified and this can be done by reference to teaching in the Bible, teaching of the Church and/or Natural Law, all of which identify rules for the Christian life. Situation ethics as a challenge to all rule-based systems of ethics: some may identify common threads which are not challenged by Fletcher – <i>agape</i> and the place of Jesus in the moral life. The intellectual integrity of Fletcher’s method may be questioned by some and used to suggest that it cannot be much of a challenge. Others may note that the Vatican had decried all situational approaches to ethics before Joseph Fletcher wrote – suggesting that whilst situation ethics might have posed a challenge, it was not Joseph Fletcher’s version. Candidates will need to demonstrate solid understanding of Fletcher’s ethical method in the course of their essays.</p>	25
<b>OR</b>		
6	<p><b>‘If there is a right to life there should also be a right to die.’ Evaluate how far ‘rights’ should be considered in decisions relating to abortion and euthanasia.</b></p> <p>Candidates have numerous options open to them. The question of ‘right to life’ may be considered a basic good, but complexity may be considered in contexts such as: war; self-defence; end of life and abortion. The issue of ‘right to die’ may be noted as something which, whilst not currently granted in our society, may be given in some contexts such as: the right to refuse consent to medical treatment, suicide of a spy entrusted with national secrets, etc. It may be argued that the ‘right to die’ is desirable in all cases on the grounds of autonomy. To what extent the language of rights is helpful or not in these debates is the critical issue, which leaves candidates the option of suggesting alternatives. Candidates should refer to both topics in the course of the essay but balance is not required for high level performance. In-depth knowledge of the issues is expected, high-level scripts demonstrating mature level of engagement through use of examples.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Topic 3 Old Testament</b>		
<b>Section A</b> [Extract from <b>NRSV</b> 2 Kings 2:6–14]		
7(a)	<p><b>Examine prophetic phenomena with close reference to:</b></p> <p><b>i) content <u>and</u></b> <b>ii) meaning.</b></p> <p>Prophetic phenomena may include the use of symbol in pre-exilic prophecy, including symbolic actions, places and artefacts; prophetic phenomena of miracles, prophetic guilds and commentary on the relationship between the spirit and the prophet. This passage marks the transition between Elijah and Elisha. Reference may be made to the meaning which was attributed to the death of Elijah in later Judaism and also within the Christian tradition.</p>	<b>10</b>
7(b)	<p><b>Examine the significance of Elijah in the development of Old Testament prophecy.</b></p> <p>Elijah traditions are complex but at face value Elijah is presented as the lone prophet who saves Yahwism from Jezebel and syncretism. Significant for the influential models given of the relationship between the prophet and King and prophet and cult. Some point of comparison between Elijah and other prophets would be helpful to candidates. It may be argued that, in some respects, Moses and Samuel are more significant since Elijah is not a law maker and does not establish any key institutions such as the Temple priesthood or monarchy. Candidates might refer, for example, to the ethical nature of Elijah's message; to the meaning of his religious experience in 1 Kings 19; his opposition to the King; and his appearance (for the first time) as a preaching prophet.</p>	<b>15</b>



Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Section B</b>		
8	<p><b>Examine the nature and meaning of the ‘Servant Songs’ in Isaiah 40–55.</b></p> <p>Candidates will be aware of the various hypotheses and combinations of hypotheses regarding the identity of the servant. Most identify the Servant as Israel personified, primarily because Jacob is called ‘my Servant’ 41:8, 44:1–2, etc., as is Israel in 41:8. The meaning of the texts would then be the transformation of Israel in Exile – Israel acquiesces to Yahweh’s plan so stores up treasure (kudos) for the future. A few argue that the Servant is Moses; some argue that it’s Cyrus – for example, in 42:1–4, and others that it is Second-Isaiah himself. Expect critical engagement with this debate. Some candidates may see the nature and meaning within a Christian context with the Servant identified as Jesus due to the detail of vicarious suffering. Critical engagement with the set text and any meaningful interpretation will be accepted in circumstances where there is no known accurate case to present.</p>	25
<b>OR</b>		
9	<p><b>‘All pre-exilic prophecy depends on the authority of Moses.’ Critically examine this claim.</b></p> <p>Wide-ranging responses are likely and will be marked on coherence and cogency. Both sides of the argument must be explored to access to the full range of marks. Candidates are expected to note the critical role played by Moses but also his absence as a named figure of authority in much pre-exilic prophecy. Candidates may find the authority of Moses in the forging of Israel’s identity through covenant, law and the occupation of the land. Equally, his authority may be seen to lie behind priesthood, prophets and cult. Alternatively, it may be argued that much has been read back into the life and work of Moses and that the texts are far from straightforward, making it difficult to say exactly what authority Moses had in that period, if any.</p>	25