



Cambridge Pre-U

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

9774/02

Paper 2 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy and Theology 1

May/June 2023

MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 50

Published

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes should be read in conjunction with the question paper and the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers.

Cambridge International will not enter into discussions about these mark schemes.

Cambridge International is publishing the mark schemes for the May/June 2023 series for most Cambridge IGCSE, Cambridge International A and AS Level and Cambridge Pre-U components, and some Cambridge O Level components.

Generic Marking Principles

These general marking principles must be applied by all examiners when marking candidate answers. They should be applied alongside the specific content of the mark scheme or generic level descriptors for a question. Each question paper and mark scheme will also comply with these marking principles.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 1:

Marks must be awarded in line with:

- the specific content of the mark scheme or the generic level descriptors for the question
- the specific skills defined in the mark scheme or in the generic level descriptors for the question
- the standard of response required by a candidate as exemplified by the standardisation scripts.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 2:

Marks awarded are always **whole marks** (not half marks, or other fractions).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 3:

Marks must be awarded **positively**:

- marks are awarded for correct/valid answers, as defined in the mark scheme. However, credit is given for valid answers which go beyond the scope of the syllabus and mark scheme, referring to your Team Leader as appropriate
- marks are awarded when candidates clearly demonstrate what they know and can do
- marks are not deducted for errors
- marks are not deducted for omissions
- answers should only be judged on the quality of spelling, punctuation and grammar when these features are specifically assessed by the question as indicated by the mark scheme. The meaning, however, should be unambiguous.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 4:

Rules must be applied consistently, e.g. in situations where candidates have not followed instructions or in the application of generic level descriptors.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 5:

Marks should be awarded using the full range of marks defined in the mark scheme for the question (however; the use of the full mark range may be limited according to the quality of the candidate responses seen).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 6:

Marks awarded are based solely on the requirements as defined in the mark scheme. Marks should not be awarded with grade thresholds or grade descriptors in mind.

Assessment objectives (AOs)

AO1	Demonstrate knowledge and understanding; identify, select and apply ideas and concepts through the use of examples and evidence.	40%
AO2	Provide a systematic critical analysis of the texts and theories, sustain a line of argument and justify a point of view. Different views should be referred to and evaluated where appropriate. Demonstrate a synoptic approach to the areas studied.	60%

In the textual questions AO1 and AO2 are assessed separately.

AO1 and AO2 are both to be considered in assessing each essay.

The **Generic Marking Scheme** should be used to decide the mark. The essay should first be placed within a level which best describes its qualities, and then at a specific point within that level to determine a mark out of 25.

The **Question-Specific Notes** provide guidance for Examiners as to the area covered by the question. These question-specific notes are not exhaustive. Candidates may answer the question from a variety of angles with different emphases and using different supporting evidence and knowledge for which they receive credit according to the Generic Marking Scheme levels. However, candidates must clearly answer the question as set and not their own question. Examiners are reminded that the insights of specific religious traditions are, of course, relevant, and it is likely that candidates will draw on the views of Jewish, Christian or Islamic theologians as well as those of philosophers who have written about the concept of God from a purely philosophical standpoint. There is nothing to prevent candidates referring to other religious traditions and these must, of course, be credited appropriately in examination responses.

Table A: Generic Marking Scheme for 10-mark questions

Level 5 9–10 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 7–8 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 5–6 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Reasonable attempt to use supporting evidence. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 3–4 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–2 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No relevant material to credit.

Table B: Generic Marking Scheme for 15-mark questions

Level 5 13–15 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 10–12 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 7–9 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 4–6 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–3 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Argument is limited or confused. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No relevant material to credit.

Table C: Generic Marking Scheme for 25-mark questions

<p>Level 5</p> <p>21–25 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
<p>Level 4</p> <p>16–20 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
<p>Level 3</p> <p>12–15 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
<p>Level 2</p> <p>8–11 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
<p>Level 1</p> <p>1–7 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Argument is limited or confused. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.

Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• No relevant material to credit.
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Question	Answer	Marks
1(a)	<p>With reference to the passage, explain Berkeley's view that Philonous' position is <u>not</u> contradictory.</p> <p>Prior to the extract, Hylas claims that his dispute with Philonous concerning the source of ideas seems to be purely a dispute about words – what Hylas calls matter, Philonous calls spirit. However, Philonous insists that one cannot apply the word matter to an unextended active being (the source of our ideas).</p> <p>In the extract provided, Hylas claims that Philonous' position leads to the contradictory view that, if God is the source of our idea of pain, God is imperfect because the idea of pain is in the mind of God and 'to suffer pain is an imperfection'. This is contradictory because God is perfect and there cannot be an imperfection in the Divine Nature.</p> <p>Philonous denies that his position is contradictory. His argument is that while God knows what every sort of painful sensation is, and what it is for his/her creatures to suffer pain as well as being the actual cause of occasional painful sensations in us, he/she does not suffer pain himself/herself. God is not a limited and dependent spirit. God is a pure spirit, not affected by bodily sensation.</p> <p>(The question does not require a critical evaluation of Berkeley's position.)</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
1(b)	<p>Critically examine Berkeley's claim that Hylas is a sceptic.</p> <p>Berkeley discusses this issue at length, referring to a wide range of sensations: pain, pleasure, taste, smell, sound, sight and perspective. It is neither possible nor necessary for candidates to cover all his arguments. Candidates may present the issue more generally, in terms of Berkeley versus Locke (and others) for example, or whether it is 'repugnant to common sense' to hold 'that there is no such thing as matter', or whether it is more sceptical to believe that there is.</p> <p>Initially, Hylas defines a sceptic as 'one that doubts of everything' and Philonous responds that the denial of matter is not an act of doubting. Subsequently, Hylas redefines a sceptic as 'someone who denies the reality and truth of things'. Philonous responds by claiming that he does not deny the reality of sensible things – sensible things are things immediately perceived by the senses. The removal of all sensible qualities would leave nothing. Hylas argues that 'to exist is one thing ... to be perceived is another'.</p> <p>One or two examples should suffice to clarify the dispute between them. Heat is the first example discussed. Philonous argues that intense heat is pain and warmth pleasure, and neither pain nor pleasure can exist without the mind. Philonous uses the example of hands placed in water to argue that it would be absurd to think that the water could be both cold and warm at the same time.</p> <p>Further examples concern taste and sound: the latter does not exist in the air, only in the mind. Philonous asserts that, if Hylas' position were adopted, it would lead to the view that sound could be seen or touched but never heard. Similarly, sensations of colour have no existence without the mind. Importantly, Philonous points out that the same arguments hold against primary qualities as well as secondary qualities. The examples given here concern extension (size) and motion (speed). Hylas claims that an object is separate from a sensation of an object – Philonous denies this, ultimately claiming that Hylas has no idea of 'matter'.</p> <p>Critical discussion may focus on some weaknesses of idealism: e.g. Berkeley cannot easily explain perceptual error; what happens to objects when they are not being perceived (familiar examples include a fire burning down or a bath filling up); why our experiences are regular and/or predictable. Alternatively, some may defend Hylas via a more positive account of representative realism (which can offer an account of sense deception, illusion, hallucination, etc., and, more importantly perhaps, is a close fit with a scientific understanding of the world).</p> <p>More generally, candidates are likely to discuss the extent to which Berkeley's idealism is genuinely compatible with common-sense and theism or whether some form of realism offers a better strategy here. It would be reasonable to query whether, by the end of the Dialogue Three, Berkeley's position has collapsed into direct realism and if so, whether the mind of God and mind-independent reality are interchangeable.</p> <p>Accept all relevant evaluative approaches to the question.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
2	<p>‘Physical objects may be defined as permanent possibilities of sensation.’ Critically examine Mill’s phenomenalism.</p> <p>Phenomenalism involves claims that physical objects are reducible to sensory experiences and the analysis of physical object statements consists of phenomenal statements describing sensory experiences. Like idealism, it argues that what we are directly aware of in perception is a sensation, percept, idea or <i>sense datum</i>. Unlike idealism, this approach accommodates the commonsense beliefs that physical objects are mind-independent, and that experience confirms the existence of physical objects. Some may describe phenomenalism as an amendment to or as a development of idealism.</p> <p>Arguably, the first statement of a phenomenalism can be found in Berkeley: ‘<i>Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the Creation, I should have seen things produced into being; that is, become perceptible, in the order described by the sacred historian.</i>’ In other words, to be is to be perceivable (<i>esse est percipi posse</i>). Whereas Berkeley thought that if a thing is perceivable, then it is perceived by God; if we remove God, we have a definition of a physical object as something which is perceivable-in-principle.</p> <p>Thus, Mill (a century after Berkeley) defines physical objects as ‘permanent possibilities of sensation’. Objects do not pop in and out of existence according to whether or not they are being perceived. Rather, they continue to exist as possible sensory experiences.</p> <p>One problem with phenomenalism is that beliefs about the physical world, if justifiable, have to be inferred from the contents of our minds. However, in order to demonstrate inductively that sense data correlate to physical objects, we require independent access to physical objects – the very thing we do not in fact have. Consequently, phenomenalism introduces subjunctive conditionals: the claim that a given object exists translates into a claim about the sensations a perceiver would or <i>might</i> have, were they to act in a certain way and have certain other sensations. However, this analysis of contingent subjective conditionals presupposes the existence of lawful regularities between patterns of sensation, but it is doubtful that there are any laws in which antecedents and consequents refer only to sensations. Moreover, if there were, phenomenalism would collapse into idealism, a position phenomenalism is attempting to avoid given that it accepts the claim that the world could exist without any perceivers.</p> <p>Arguably, a fatal criticism of phenomenalism was that presented by Chisholm. This focused on an analytic consequence of a given phenomenalist proposition asserting the existence of some physical object. There are hypothetical situations in which a physical object proposition – expressed in ‘phenomenalese’ – could be true, but the experiential proposition alleged to follow from it is false. In order to avoid this problem, phenomenologists might introduce an ‘under normal conditions’ clause, although this too would be problematic for classical phenomenalism as it removes the particular setting in which any individual perceiver experiences something – what exactly <i>are</i> ‘normal’ perceptual conditions? Some might develop Chisholm’s line of reasoning here to consider the extent to which acts of perception are undetermined by phenomenal reality (his ‘speckled hen’ example).</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
2	<p>The question does not require candidates to address linguistic phenomenalism, but some may refer to it. If doing so, candidates should be aware that it has a host of problems of its own. So much so that advocates of linguistic phenomenalism, such as Ayer, eventually accepted that it was not viable.</p> <p>Some will argue that realist positions provide stronger grounds from which to explain both the causes and regularity of our experience – for example, the regularity of seeing a plant on the table is due to the material fact that there is a plant on the table. Some might refer to arguments presented by Locke on the involuntary nature and coherence of sensation here, or perhaps to Russell’s inference to the best explanation. Alternatively, others will argue that data received from sense perception is the only access to reality we have. If the latter approach is taken, and phenomenalism is preferred to idealism, some may accept that matter is the permanent possibility of sensation.</p> <p>Credit all relevant lines of evaluation.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
3	<p>Evaluate foundationalism.</p> <p>Candidates are likely to address this issue through references to Descartes and the classical British empiricists, particularly Locke and Hume. Credit recent foundational accounts of a base/superstructure model of our knowledge if provided.</p> <p>Cartesian foundationalism is concerned with how a system of beliefs can be built from an immediately justified foundation. Following the doubts of the first meditation, occasioned by the efforts of a malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning to deceive him, Descartes arrives at ‘I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.’ In other words, the cogito, ‘I think therefore I am’. In short, if he is deceived, he exists as that which is deceived. This is the first certainty and the basis for further knowledge claims.</p> <p>Various objections have focused on the ‘I’ in ‘I think therefore I am’. For example, it is an idealised ‘I’, the ‘I’ of any thinking thing, and does not necessarily pick out Descartes. Some might argue whether the existence of a thought entitles Descartes to the inference to a thinker (is Descartes consistent here?), or whether this ‘I’ is better conceived as a ‘grammatical convenience’ (Russell). Due to arguments like these, rationalist foundationalism does not look promising.</p> <p>Empiricism may fare better. Locke famously likened the mind at birth to a ‘<i>tabula rasa</i>’. Sense data, given in experience, is the foundation of knowledge. There are no innate principles in the mind – if there were, children and idiots would be aware of them. Condillac’s statue may also feature in discussions. Some responses may be rooted in Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas: ‘all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones’. Sense impressions come first and are more forceful than the ideas they inspire. Even those ideas that appear not to originate in impressions, such as the idea of God, arise through augmenting without limit human qualities such as wisdom and goodness sensed in others and ourselves. Locke argues: ‘the fewer senses any man ... hath and the fewer and duller the impressions are that are made upon them; the more remote are they from that knowledge which is to be found in some men’. Similarly, Hume argues that if a sense is defective, there are no correspondent ideas: ‘a blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds.’</p> <p>More generally, candidates might critically analyse foundationalism as a general theory of justification, perhaps as a response to the Agrippan trilemma, whereby inferential beliefs are supported by a basic, non-inferential belief – for instance God, the self, etc. – which lends doxastic support to the system of beliefs as a whole. But if this is the case, why are there competing accounts of what this belief consists in and what happens to this superstructure if the foundations are themselves queried? Some might examine competing accounts of justification – for instance coherentism and infinitism, etc. – to shed critical light on this view, although care should be taken not to lose sight of the question.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of enquiry.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
4(a)	<p>With reference to the passage, explain why the partisan does not allow anything to count decisively against ‘the Stranger is on our side’.</p> <p>This extract is Basil Mitchell’s contribution to the debate in ‘University’. The other contributors are Flew and Hare. Flew challenges both Hare and Mitchell to address the issue of ‘what would have to occur ... to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or the existence of, God?’</p> <p>Mitchell’s response focuses on the problem of evil, and therefore the stakes are high. Mitchell insists, against Flew, that the theologian does recognise that the experience of pain and suffering counts against Christian doctrine. However, he does not accept that it <i>a/ways</i> counts decisively against it because of his faith and trust in God. Hence, in Mitchell’s parable, because the stranger seems sincere and deeply impresses the resistance fighter, the latter decides to put his trust in the stranger as an act of reasonable faith. Consequently, on occasions when the stranger’s actions appear to work against the interests and well-being of members of the resistance, the partisan does not allow this to count against his faith in the stranger and his belief that the stranger ‘is on our side’.</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
4(b)	<p>Evaluate Mitchell’s claim that the partisan’s trust in the Stranger is not a ‘blik’.</p> <p>Candidates are likely to begin by explaining what a ‘blik’ is. Most will probably do so by outlining Hare’s parable of the lunatic student, who, despite evidence to the contrary, is convinced that all dons want to murder him. The student dismisses evidence to the contrary on the grounds of the dons’ diabolical cunning. Hare argues that the student’s ‘blik’ is insane: the student has a wrong ‘blik’ about dons. The vast majority of students have a right ‘blik’. The lunatic student’s ‘blik’ is not to be replaced by no ‘blik’, rather it is very important to replace it with a right ‘blik’ because our ‘bliks’ relate to issues we care or should care about: without a ‘blik’ there can be no explanations since ‘bliks’ decide what counts here.</p> <p>Mitchell claims that his parable differs from Hare’s because, whereas Hare’s ‘lunatic’ will not allow any evidence to count against his/her ‘blik’, many instances may or do count against the partisan’s trust in the stranger. Thus, the partisan’s trust should not be conceived in terms of ‘blind faith’. However, due to his commitment to trust the stranger, the partisan does not allow any of these instances to count decisively against the stranger. Moreover, unlike the lunatic student, the partisan has a reason to trust the stranger, based on the stranger’s character. Mitchell does accept, however, that the stranger’s ambiguous behaviour does constitute ‘the trial of his faith’. He claims that it is impossible to say for how long or how well his faith will hold up, because this depends upon the strength of the initial impression created by the stranger as well as on how he interprets the stranger’s behaviour.</p> <p>Mitchell accepts that, for example, ‘God loves humanity’ resembles ‘the stranger is on our side’ insofar as neither are conclusively falsifiable. However, ‘God loves humanity’ is a significant expression of faith that is neither vacuous nor provisional. Candidates might evidence wider reading and understanding by referencing Flew’s critique of Mitchell (essay 4) who responds by arguing that whereas the stranger may have plausible explanations for his ambiguous behaviour – because the stranger is merely human – it is less clear that the extent of pain and suffering is consistent with an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God.</p> <p>Is the partisan’s trust in the stranger very different from a ‘blik’? Some candidates may accept that it is, on grounds outlined above. However, some may point out that even ‘protest theologians’ did not give up their faith following horrendous moral evil, and, beyond this, there have been numerous theological attempts to explain both logical and evidential problems of evil. Consequently, some will claim that maintaining faith given the extent of both moral and natural evils does not seem to be very different from a ‘blik’.</p> <p>Accept any relevant line of evaluation.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
5	<p>Critically examine the claim that moral language is emotive.</p> <p>Emotivism developed in the 1930s – influenced by the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle of philosophers, embracing verificationism – only statements verifiable either logically or empirically were cognitively meaningful. Statements are meaningful if they can be shown to be true or false: if this cannot be done then a statement is meaningless.</p> <p>Moral statements are neither logically verifiable through the analysis of the terms involved, nor empirically verifiable through sense experience – so they cannot be shown to be either true or false. A J Ayer claims <i>‘If a sentence makes no statement at all, there is obviously no sense in asking whether what it says is true or false’</i>. In cases of moral disagreement: <i>‘there is plainly no sense in asking which of us is right for neither of us is asserting a genuine proposition’</i>. Moral statements are factually insignificant although may have a non-literal significance for an agent.</p> <p>According to Ayer, what we are doing when we use moral language is expressing an attitude, feeling or emotion and attempting to influence the attitudes and feelings of others. He argues that ‘it is possible to influence other people by a suitable choice of emotive language’, and also by appeal to non-moral facts. Thus, ‘we may define the meaning of the various ethical words in terms both of the different feelings they are ordinarily taken to express, and also the different responses which they are calculated to provoke.’ In short, moral utterances are expressive (they express the speaker’s feelings) and persuasive (they attempt to influence the feelings of the listener). They are not the kind of statement that can be considered true or false.</p> <p>Problems are many and various. G J Warnock notes ‘the pulses do not beat faster at encountering the word ‘right’; there is nothing particularly stirring about ‘good’ or ‘ought’’. His point is that moral disagreements between people are often stated in calm and dispassionate terms. Moreover, people may discuss the moral implications of any given action from a perspective of broad agreement, in which case they are not trying to evoke feelings in others. It is not clear that this theory of ethics successfully distinguishes moral discourse from other areas of discourse – advertising, propaganda, etc.</p> <p>Similarly, the notion of ‘emotive meaning’ is not clear: a statement has the same meaning whether uttered in a context intended to influence others or not (‘the cinema is on fire’ has the same meaning whether uttered in the cinema or in a news broadcast). Thus, emotivism tends to conflate meaning and use. Furthermore, in order to influence others, we have to develop our own moral views – how do we do that? A strength of emotivism, however, is that it does offer a clear connection between moral views and behaviour: for example, we are more likely not to drink and drive if we strongly feel that drink driving is wrong. It also dovetails with arguments for descriptive moral relativism (Mackie) – if there are moral facts, why have we yet to discover them?</p> <p>Evaluation may extend beyond emotivism. For example, some may be sympathetic to non-cognitive approaches but argue that prescriptivism is a more convincing approach. Like emotivism, moral language is primarily expressive; unlike emotivism, prescriptivism regards the formation of moral views and judgements as a rational process. R M Hare (like Ayer) was</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
5	<p>concerned to analyse ‘the language of morals’ and to reconcile our freedom to form our own moral views with the view that moral judgements are rational. In order to do so, he advances three theses: moral judgements are prescriptive; moral judgements are universalisable; there are logical relations between prescriptions that allow us to develop reasoned moral arguments.</p> <p>Alternatively, candidates may reject emotivism (and prescriptivism if referred to) in favour of a cognitive view of morality in which moral beliefs, like other beliefs, can be true or false. However, this would need to be argued for.</p> <p>Credit all relevant evaluative approaches.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
6	<p>‘Religious language does not express truth.’ Evaluate this claim.</p> <p>One definition of knowledge, the tripartite definition, is that knowledge is justified true belief (perhaps with a further qualification such as indefeasibility). Consequently, if religious language does not express truth, religious claims do not constitute knowledge. Discussion is likely to focus both on explanations of some alleged limitations of religious language as well as on a more positive picture of the functions of religious language. It is likely that candidates will refer to both of the texts set for study.</p> <p>Ayer rules out the possibility of religious knowledge on the grounds that ‘there can be no way of proving that the existence of a god, such as the God of Christianity, is even probable’. He claims that, in talking of ‘God’, Christians are employing a metaphysical term and, as such, their claims do not ‘possess any literal significance’. They are neither true nor false. All utterances concerning God, including those of atheists, are nonsensical. Theistic assertions are claims that are neither valid nor invalid. Beyond this, Ayer proceeds to claim that if the nature of God transcends human understanding, it is because that nature is unintelligible. Ayer also rejects experiential arguments, such as the argument from religious experience, because such arguments presuppose the existence of a transcendent being, the cause and object of such experiences. However, this is a concept that is not empirically verifiable and, consequently, has no literal significance. The notion of religious experience is, he claims, only of interest from a psychological point of view.</p> <p>Candidates may argue that Ayer’s approach is misguided insofar as his account of both science and religion is false. For example, some candidates may be aware that the falsification principle derives from Karl Popper’s attempt in ‘The Logic of Scientific Discovery’ to define the idea of an ‘empirical science’. Popper argued that a successful theory of empirical science is one that submits a theory to tests and which the theory is able to withstand. He argued that genuine empirical science is characterised by falsifiability rather than verifiability. Whether or not religious faith, commitment and belief are subject to refutation by experience might then form a basis for discussion.</p> <p>Flew applies falsification to religious belief via his example – adapted from John Wisdom – of two explorers who come upon a clearing in the jungle containing both flowers and weeds. One explorer claims that a gardener must tend the plot, the other explorer disagrees. They keep watch, set up a barbed wire fence, electrify it and patrol with bloodhounds. A gardener is undetected but neither change their initial view. This leads the sceptical explorer to pose the question ‘how does ... an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener differ from an imaginary gardener or even from no gardener at all?’ The belief that there is a gardener has ‘suffered death by a thousand qualifications’. Mitchell’s example of the partisan and the stranger is a response to this.</p> <p>Evaluation may also include a critical discussion of whether or not religious belief, commitment or faith involves the kind of activities, methods and theoretical conclusions found in the natural sciences – specifically, whether the falsification principle applies to religious faith, commitment and belief. Hick’s example of travellers on the road to the celestial city suggests that it does not. Hick’s view is that it is impossible to falsify theism, but it is possible to conceive of after-death experiences that would verify theism.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
6	<p>Some may argue that religious commitment is just as likely to follow from ‘a blind leap of faith’ – from which ‘the rock of God’ is found (Kierkegaard) – rather than from a principle drawn from scientific methodology. Phillips, for example, argues that claims made within different religious language games are not in need of verification or falsification because they are not claims that can be either false or meaningless.</p> <p>Alternative accounts of religious faith and commitment will be offered by some candidates, e.g. religious commitment involves a decision ‘to follow an agapeistic way of life’ (Braithwaite) or that ‘belief-in’ is more important than ‘belief-that’ (Price). Clearly, religious beliefs possess an important regulative/behavioural function although, in itself, this does not rule out that religious beliefs are also hypotheses. As such, they may be challenged – e.g. by logical and evidential problems of evil – and such challenges may result in a loss of faith for some but not, apparently, for many. Given relevant experiences, some will lose their faith or weaken their commitment at some stages in life – equally, however, some non-believers will gain faith (including Flew).</p> <p>Answers may reasonably hinge on what is meant by ‘truth’ rather than on definitions of knowledge. Some will look at reformed epistemology, e.g. Plantinga’s argument that beliefs can be justified by more than evidence alone: belief in God can be properly basic, not inferred from other truths.</p> <p>Credit all relevant lines of evaluation.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
7(a)	<p>With reference to the passage, explain Polkinghorne’s understanding of personal identity.</p> <p>Prior to the passage, Polkinghorne acknowledges his personal interest in ‘holding the physicist and the priest together’ by according proper respect to the mental and the material – a task he sees as providing an integrated view of the nature of reality to reach the deepest level of understanding. In the passage, he claims that, if taken apart, all that one would find of him are the quarks, gluons and electrons that compose the physical universe. His soul would not be found and he would not be encountered. In order to encounter <i>him</i>, it is necessary to accept his ‘delicately organised totality’ of body and soul. Mental phenomena and material phenomena are complementary aspects of a single reality. Thus, he rejects idealism as he refuses to accord priority of the mental over the physical; similarly, he rejects physical reductionism as it assigns reality only to the material so that the mental becomes epiphenomenal. (He also rejects Cartesian dualism because it fails to explain interaction.)</p> <p>Beyond the extract, Polkinghorne likens his approach to the Aristotelian notion of the soul as the form of the body (expect references to hylomorphism) and candidates might develop this point to evidence wider reading and understanding. He argues that this accords well with both Hebrew and Christian understandings of humanity and with notions of resurrection. He also notes an apparent similarity with Platonism but rejects this because he has not accorded priority to the mental or described the world as eternal and uncreated.</p> <p>Thus, personal identity is conceived of as a ‘rich pattern’ or soul which God will come to remember and replicate in the world to come. Such a view is compatible with both religion and science.</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
7(b)	<p>Evaluate Polkinghorne’s claim that some contrasts between science and theology are ‘ill-founded’.</p> <p>Polkinghorne refers to Theissen in noting three supposed contradictions between scientific thought and faith. These are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Hypothetical scientific thought versus apodeictic faith. 2 Science is subject to falsification, faith goes against the facts. 3 Scientific thought delights in dissension whereas faith is based on consensus. <p>Polkinghorne disagrees with all three: he sees these as ‘false opposites’. Rather, theology and science ‘share a comradely concern’ for truth about the world. He accepts that theology requires many perspectives in order to frame its account of ‘infinite-dimensional’ reality and attempts to sketch out a scientist’s approach to theology. Polkinghorne acknowledges that ‘in physical science we transcend the natural world and have power to put it to the test’ whereas ‘in theology ... the object of our inquiry transcends us’. Moreover, on its own, theology only leads us to the ‘cosmic architect’ or ‘great mathematician’, not to God. To reach God we require worship, prayer and revelation. Nonetheless, theology and science are constituent parts of ‘scientia’ and both should be seen as rational quests leading ultimately to ‘a unity of knowledge’ which respects the insights of different disciplines.</p> <p>He is critical of certain theories, for example, ‘sociobiology’, which attempt to reduce sociological and ethical issues to genetics. Similarly, just as ‘the testimony of the tone deaf’ should not negate the reality of music, so too those without a sense of the divine should not reject the views of those who possess such a sense. Rather, we should be open to ‘the nature of the object’. He refers to Christology as an example, encompassing the work of Christ, salvation through Christ and divine reconciliation. Science liberates us from the ‘undue tyranny of commonsense’ and so does theology. The duality of wave and particle in particle physics is as perplexing as the duality of God and man in Jesus Christ. Theological science concerns a desire to understand: it faces a particular difficulty insofar as the nature of its object transcends us. Consequently, we employ analogies, metaphors and symbols to assist understanding. Nonetheless, Christian symbolism concerning life, death and resurrection is rooted in history. Just as theoretical and experimental insights coexist in physics, so representation and interpretation coexist in theology.</p> <p>The sciences enjoy ‘procedures’ for testing insights whereas God is known through religious experience, historical events and patterns of the world – tradition, scripture and reason. The validity of theological investigation depends upon an ability to discern patterns, offer coherent explanations and insights into ‘the way things are’. Myth is concerned with conveying ‘deep truth’. Polkinghorne refers to Einstein’s claim that ‘Religion without science is blind. Science without religion is lame.’ Polkinghorne prefers: ‘Religion without science is confined; it fails to be completely open to reality. Science without religion is incomplete; it fails to attain the deepest possible understanding.’ He argues that the insights that science provides require a more profound explanation; similarly, the religious view that the world is the creation of God must learn about the world through scientific research.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
7(b)	<p>Candidates may accept the view that some contrasts between science and theology are unfounded. Theologians do not simply assert an alleged truth, and faith is not a given that cannot be withdrawn. Alternatively, some may argue that this approach pays scant attention to the philosophy of science. Kuhn, for example, argues that science advances through paradigm shifts – a given theory may be paradigmatic and resist falsification for some time before a new emerging paradigm takes hold. Dissension tends to concern the design of and/or the results obtained from experimentation rather than a critique of theory. However, it is not clear that theology advances through paradigm shifts. Popper argues that science is characterised by attempts to falsify established scientific theory – so that scientific knowledge remains ‘tentative forever’. It seems unlikely that Polkinghorne would accept that faith is similarly tentative. It might also be argued that scientific research into the nature of reality does not require an explanation beyond and more profound than science can provide.</p> <p>Accept all relevant evaluative approaches, e.g. references to ‘God of the gaps’ type arguments, epistemic frameworks or noetic structures.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of enquiry.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
8	<p>‘Evidence of apparent design, order and purpose in the world strongly supports the existence of God.’ Evaluate this claim.</p> <p>Candidates should recognise this question as an invitation to discuss the merits of various teleological arguments for the existence of God and consequently, make references to Aquinas, Paley, Tennant and Swinburne. Some may prefer to outline those general features of our experience of the world that are proposed in support of the claim – in particular intelligibility, fine-tuning and chance and necessity as appeals to orderliness, law-like interconnectedness, beauty, intelligibility and the development of conscious beings capable of recognising and appreciating such features. Some may draw from John Polkinghorne’s treatment of intelligibility, fine-tuning and chance and necessity arguments. Clearly, the main issue has been whether such features are due to intelligent design or are a result of chance.</p> <p>Aquinas focused on goal-directed activity in nature. As an archer fires an arrow at a target, so too does nature strive for some goal. This cannot be accidental. There must be an intelligence directing this activity, and this we call God. Paley’s example of finding a watch on a heath leads us to assume that it has some designer. By analogy, we could say the same of nature. Nature displays purpose and regularity. By analogy with a watch, this is suggestive of a designer. (Some may prefer to discuss the human eye.)</p> <p>Modern versions of the argument, such as Tennant’s ‘weak anthropic principle’, suggest the conditions of the universe allowing life to develop need not have been the case. God is probably responsible for this careful balance. Similarly, Swinburne offers a probabilistic argument. The chances of intelligent human life developing are very low. Consequently, universal constants appear to have been fine-tuned to allow for the development of intelligent observers. Similarly, beauty and order in the universe is not accidental; it is suggestive of God’s intelligence and creativity.</p> <p>There are numerous criticisms of different versions of the argument. Many candidates will refer to a range of Hume’s points: we have no experience of universe-creation and would only possess grounds for detecting design in the universe if we had experience of the design of Paley’s version of the teleological other universes – which we do not. Perhaps the universe is more like a giant vegetable than a watch – it simply grew. Possibly, a team of Gods designed the universe; machines develop through a process of trial and error. Similarly, many universes may have been ‘botched and bungled’. Perhaps this universe is one of them. Faults in the design (e.g. ‘natural evils’) possibly suggest an infant or senile God may have been responsible.</p> <p>Kant argued that order, purpose and design are not in the world: rather these result from categories we impose on experience in order to make sense of it and, more importantly perhaps, that the most that the design argument can prove is the existence of an ‘architect of the world’, not a ‘creator of the world’. Paley’s version of the teleological argument is subject to attack from Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Perfectly adapted creatures are not the result of design: rather they are a result of random mutations and natural selection, leading to ‘the survival of the fittest’. Later versions of the argument may be equipped to resist this point. However, more recently, scientists such as Dawkins have argued that ‘the universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good,</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
8	<p>nothing but blind pitiless indifference.'</p> <p>Candidates are free to evaluate teleological arguments positively. Kant acknowledged that the teleological arguments deserve 'respect' and strengthen faith. It is difficult to deny the presence of order and complexity in the universe. The use of analogy makes the argument comprehensible: something within our experience explains something beyond it – creation. The argument is, perhaps, compatible with both evolution and the Big Bang: these could both be part of the design of the universe. The idea of God as designer reinforces the idea that God is involved in the history and development of the universe and is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.</p> <p>Alternatively, a common objection to arguments from design and fine-tuning arguments is that postulating the existence of God does not solve the problem of design, but transfers it up a level. For example, Smart argues: 'If we postulate God in addition to the created universe we increase the complexity of our hypothesis. We have all the complexity of the universe itself, and we have in addition the at least equal complexity of God. If the theist can show the atheist that postulating God actually reduces the complexity of one's total world view ... the atheist should be a theist.'</p> <p>Credit all relevant lines of evaluation.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
9	<p>Critically examine the concept of resurrection.</p> <p>While this is not a text-based question, candidates may refer to views expressed by Hick in Chapter XVI of 'Evil and the God of Love' – 'The Infinite Future Good'. He claims that, for religious naturalism, the notion of everlasting life is 'a symbol of the worth of human personality' and that 'the expectation of a life after death is ... part of the total organism of Christian belief.' Belief in the resurrection of Christ is a prominent theme of the New Testament writers. Hick proceeds to argue, in line with the main theme of his book, that belief in an afterlife is a corollary of belief in a transcendent, personal God – who would not want creatures created in his or her image 'to pass out of existence whilst his (or her) purpose for them was still ... largely unfulfilled.' Hence, belief in an after-life is also essential to theodicy. God is gradually forming perfected members of humanity, an ideal that we can glimpse in Christ. The process begins in this life and extends into an intermediate state. Hick describes his theodicy as a 'doctrine based on hope': the hope that, beyond death, God will resurrect or reconstitute the human personality so all humans can enter the Kingdom of God – a state of blissful happiness representing 'God's infinite love for his children'.</p> <p>There are a number of views on how (if at all) human beings could survive bodily death and continue to exist as conscious persons. These include survival through successive reincarnations, the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body and the view that survival of bodily death, as a conscious person, is a logical impossibility. Christian theology is most closely associated with resurrection. Aquinas held that resurrection is the only genuine Christian notion: immortality of the soul is an import from Platonism. Moreover, it is doubtful whether an immaterial soul could establish personal identity. There are no criteria for establishing whether a person who is 'raised' possesses the same soul (although possessing the same soul may be a criterion of personal identity even though we cannot test for it).</p> <p>Early objections to bodily resurrection focused on problems such as how the body of a Christian who, consumed by fish after drowning, could be resurrected. However, presumably it would be possible for an omnipotent and omniscient Being to locate, collect and reconstitute all parts of the original body. Alternatively, God may use new matter, structured in the same way, to resurrect the body: some will argue that God will provide a new 'resurrection body' and/or that resurrection may involve the raising of a 'spiritual body'.</p> <p>If Hick's view that successive incarnations in an intermediate state may be required before one is re-united with a resurrection body later in the eschaton is adopted, it might be difficult to recognise perfected 'Watkins' as the original 'Watkins'. Some will argue that souls survive, inhabit a realm of mental images, are aware of other souls and communicate telepathically. However, this is not the standard Christian view.</p> <p>Some candidates may develop an entirely different critical line of argument relating to religious pluralism and the conflicting truth claims of diverse religious traditions. If Christian religious experience entitles Christians to hold distinctively Christian beliefs, then so should, for example, Buddhism and Hinduism. Thus, candidates may discuss whether or not reincarnation should be</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
9	<p>preferred to resurrection and/or whether there is only one true religion and that accepting it is the only sure route to salvation. Candidates may argue for a distinction between 'an ultimate reality as humanly conceived' and 'an ultimate reality as it is'. Alternatively, some will question whether there is only one ultimate reality, several ultimate realities or none at all. Discussion may focus on whether salvation and/or eternal life depends upon accepting that there is only one true religion. The corollary of this would be that God's creation has included billions of people who have no chance of salvation.</p> <p>Credit all relevant lines of argumentation.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
10(a)	<p>With reference to the passage, explain the nature of miracles in John’s Gospel.</p> <p>The signs (miracles) in the Fourth Gospel are often deemed to have originated from a particular source; alternative views are that the source was Mark or the tradition as a whole, in which case arguments tend to be made for John’s careful shaping of the narrative. Candidates may note this in connection to the point that the deliberate use of the word sign (<i>semeion</i>) indicates a shift in purpose from the synoptic tradition where the word is usually the word for power (<i>dunamis</i>). Candidates are likely to suggest reasons for this shift; for example, a hint that there are symbolic layers to be understood in the gospel or else the suggestion that Jesus was not to be confused with a magician, perhaps revealing something of the <i>Sitz im Leben</i> of the author.</p> <p>Candidates may explore the linking of the seven signs to seven narrative accounts, stimulated by this passage. The sign is almost incidental to the teaching and the interweaving with the seven ‘I am’ sayings may be explored or other approaches that highlight the nature of signs as Christological revelations. For John, the full meaning is hidden until after the crucifixion (this is perhaps emphasised by the presence of signs only in the first part of the text). Candidates may also look at the symbolic nature of the signs, or a range of tools the author of the Gospel has employed (e.g. symbolism (light vs dark), irony, structure of the text and so on).</p> <p>The earlier signs are often argued to be part of journeys, starting and finishing in Jerusalem or grouped in two pairs and a three, of increasing glory or significance. There may be discussion of the exclusion of the miraculous crossing of the sea and/or Chapter 21. There are many different possible interpretations and approaches, and candidates may offer a sample.</p> <p>This passage specifically encourages discussion of what the signs might demonstrate about God working out God’s purpose through people and events. Chapter 11 does not focus on the actual moment of miracle as much as the teaching: indeed, Jesus waits before even travelling to Lazarus’s tomb. Candidates might suggest that this shows something of God’s providence or else that this suggests a literary form to the Gospel.</p> <p>If there is a sense of escalation in the signs through the Gospel, this passage also points to the ultimate sign (brought into reality through the incarnation of the Logos) that is yet to come in the Gospel: that of the resurrection. Lazarus’s raising is less significant than the resurrection (e.g. he was still bound in cloths) but serves to point towards the glory that is to be made manifest at the end of the Gospel. It is after the resurrection that John reiterates the purpose of including the signs (20:30f).</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question.</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
10(b)	<p>‘John’s Gospel has a different purpose from that of the Synoptic Gospels.’ Critically examine this claim.</p> <p>Candidates might begin by exploring the purpose of the Fourth Gospel. There are many different approaches and some may look at the idea of symbolism, some at the centrality of the Incarnate Logos and some at the notion of the ‘spiritual gospel’. They may then explore the purpose of the Synoptic Gospels and examine the need to record the life and teachings of Jesus as eye-witness accounts when faced with the death of early Christians (and the delay of the Parousia). Reference may be made to Luke’s orderly account or to narrative forms as well as to particular situations in the communities of the authors as seen in the choices of redaction.</p> <p>Some candidates may suggest that the purposes of the Synoptic and Fourth Gospels are ultimately the same. They seek to provide an account suitable for their ‘readership’ and to preserve the message of Jesus for posterity. They seek to demonstrate Jesus as a teacher, miracle worker and as the risen Saviour.</p> <p>Candidates might explore arguments against the claim by noting the absence of ethical teachings in John. Whereas the Synoptic Gospels wished to show Jesus as the teacher who was proclaiming the coming kingdom, the Fourth Gospel focuses on faith in Jesus (cf Jn 20:30f), the incarnate and resurrected Logos. Some might suggest with, for example, Brown that this is simply John focusing in on one aspect rather than rejecting other aspects, and that his ethics is bound up in the commandment to love, inherent through Johannine literature.</p> <p>Candidates might examine the higher Christology of the Fourth Gospel. They might suggest that this shows that beliefs about Jesus had developed over time, rather than sitting in contradiction to the Synoptic Gospels; others might suggest that there is no contradiction. Some might point to a difference in the purpose, however, through John’s emphasis on the divine against, for example, Mark’s lower Christology.</p> <p>All gospels seem to write for a Christian ‘readership’, though some have argued that John has more of an apologetic purpose in his desire to convert Jews (e.g. Sanders and Mastin). Others suggest that all the gospels are <i>apologia</i>. John also seems to have a more developed awareness of the possible threat from Roman authorities, possibly due to his time of writing, and seeks to reconcile with these authorities more than the Synoptic Gospels.</p> <p>Some candidates may refer to the dating of the Gospels in examining their purpose: accepting a later date for John will necessarily introduce a different context and purpose, such as the non-appearance of the Parousia; increasing reflection on the person of Jesus; the distinct identity of Christians, independent to Jews and resulting antagonism between the groups; the fall of Jerusalem; the rise of Docetism; increased or looming persecution.</p> <p>Candidates are free to approach this in any number of ways and so all relevant approaches to the question should be accepted.</p> <p>Credit all relevant and accurate lines of discussion.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
11	<p>Critically discuss Jesus' apocalyptic teaching.</p> <p>Candidates are likely to define apocalyptic as the 'unveiling of the future' or 'revelation'. They might make observations about apocalyptic literature, such as symbolism, vision language and dualism. They might make the distinction with eschatology. Candidates may focus on Mark 13 or use a broader range of examples. When candidates focus on texts, their use of biblical criticism tools will be relevant.</p> <p>This is a broad question that will elicit a number of different approaches. Some might approach this through the methodology of the quest for the historical Jesus. Those that follow Schweitzer will identify Jesus as an apocalyptic prophet and so regard many of the apocalyptic teachings as genuine sayings. Those that follow, for example, the Jesus Seminar approach will reject these sayings as authentic as Jesus was focused on social reform. Some, such as Sanders, simply suggest that Jesus was mistaken.</p> <p>Some candidates may use specific teachings as their approach to the question. For example, Mark 9:1 and 13:30 are not redacted in the other Synoptic Gospels and clearly demonstrate a belief that the end is coming within a generation. The nature of the apocalyptic tradition is given emphasis in Matthew 24 and 25, for example (cp Mk 13 and Lk 21), and certainly Matthew and Luke separate future disastrous events from the destruction of Jerusalem. However, the (relatively) limited amount of apocalyptic material in the Gospels may qualify this emphasis. Candidates may also draw on other passages: predictions of destruction, wars, false messiahs, etc., the Kingdom of God teachings and so on.</p> <p>Candidates may explore the title 'son of man' and its apocalyptic interpretations in the context of Daniel 7. They may, however, qualify this with the humanity of the title.</p> <p>John's Gospel is regarded as the least apocalyptic of the Gospels given it is focused on the incarnation, the work of the Spirit and the revelation of divine mysteries. Some explore the shift in John from the present/future distinction of the Synoptic Gospels to the temporal/eternal life distinction of the Fourth Gospel. John is certainly more focused on the glory of the Logos than future events.</p> <p>Candidates might explore the basis of New Testament apocalyptic in Jewish traditions. Jewish apocalyptic emerged after the exile and in response to new levels of suffering. In this context, the Gospels portray Jesus as bringing about the ultimate solutions to the troubles of the day. If Mark is agreed to be the most apocalyptic gospel, the sense of urgency to be ready for the ultimate intervention is noted. This simple futuristic eschatology is seen throughout the Synoptic Gospels and is replaced by realised eschatology in the Fourth Gospel.</p> <p>Some candidates might note the work of Dunn in discussing critically the notion of Jesus fulfilling future expectations. Others might contrast Bultmann's approach for whom eschatological material should be regarded in the context of the individual. Many other scholarly approaches could be taken.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
11	Credit all relevant and accurate lines of discussion.	

Question	Answer	Marks
12	<p>‘The Synoptic Gospels successfully demonstrate that Jesus was the Messiah.’ Critically assess this view.</p> <p>Candidates may begin simply by trying to define ‘Messiah’ in terms of a saviour figure, the Davidic King, anointed one and so on, making reference to the Jewish tradition. They are likely to discuss specific aspects of Jesus’ life and ministry to illustrate their answers throughout (e.g. miracle-worker, forgiver of sins, teacher/Rabbi, saviour, one who reveals God), but should not simply retell stories or narrate passages.</p> <p>The Messiah is not as central to Jewish thought as sometimes realised and therefore it is challenging to be clear what the expectation was for a messiah. The Synoptic Gospels each have a different approach to their portrait of Jesus. Some argue that Matthew is the clearest that Jesus is the Messianic Saviour promised by the Old Testament. Others suggest that Mark emphasises the suffering servant aspect highlighted by Deutero-Isaiah, and the universalism of Luke matches with the Old Testament image of God being the creator of all and Jesus the fulfilment of Isaiah’s promises.</p> <p>The presence of John the Baptist as an Elijah figure in all gospels and the genealogies in Matthew and Luke make it difficult to deny that the intention is to locate Jesus as the Messiah from the outset of the texts. This continues with the ongoing references to the suffering of the son of man (i.e. representative) and ultimately the sacrifice on the cross.</p> <p>Candidates might argue that Jesus the social figure was fulfilling the prophetic function assumed by the Old Testament of the Messiah. Jesus’ ethical teachings were designed to show him as a modern but orthodox teacher of the Law, very much continuing the Jewish tradition. His miracles fulfilled the expectations of the Messiah from Isaiah 61, though this is only made explicit in Luke.</p> <p>Candidates might suggest that the gospel writers are not clear that Jesus was the Messiah specifically expected by the Jews because in many ways he was not. It is not necessarily clear from the Old Testament that the Messiah would be God-incarnate, nor that his works of miracle would exceed the expectations of Isaiah. Aspects such as the Virgin Birth and the resurrection are also not (necessarily) expected.</p> <p>Candidates might argue that as works of apologetic, the portrayal of Jesus as the <i>Christian</i> Messiah is successfully done. However, in portraying Jesus as exceeding the Jewish expectation, the gospels might not be as accessible to Jewish readers and may be less likely to lead to persuading a Jewish audience that Jesus was the expected Messiah.</p> <p>Some candidates might observe that the moments of revelation in the gospels (e.g. Baptism, Transfiguration) are the moments in which Jesus is shown to be the anointed one. They might point to other characteristics of the Messiah in the Old Testament (e.g. building the kingdom of God, an eternal kingdom; being a light to the nations; being of the house of David, etc.) and make links to Jesus’ work. Some candidates will argue that it is only with Christian lenses that Messianic promises are to be found in the Old Testament (e.g. in the response to Original Sin).</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
12	Candidates might compare the efficacy of the portrayal of Jesus as the expected Messiah in the three Gospels or take a more holistic approach, such as the need to read the Synoptic Gospels alongside the rest of the New Testament or through the lens of faith or experience. Credit all relevant and accurate lines of discussion.	